The Nanjing Massacre:

On Japanese who deny and others who accept the truth

 

 

Graduated from University of Minnesota
Minneapolis,  Minnesota,  USA

 

Why does Japan continue to ignore or dismiss the wartime atrocities?  This essay will look into the actions that the Japanese government has taken, the responses of Japanese civilians, the roadblocks that have prevented this atrocity from being officially recognized by the Japanese government, and offer solutions that may help the recognition of the atrocity by the Japanese government and thereby help the relations between Japan and China.

    One may ask what has Japan done about the atrocities that were committed during the World War II.  This has been up to those who have power in the Japanese government.  For the majority of period after World War II and the Allied Occupation, the right wing, nationalists, and hardliner factions within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had control of the Japanese government along with popular support from various sectors in society (Ogawa, 2000: 42).  They denied any wrong doings by Japan during World War II and further questioned if the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities such as the Comfort Women had even occurred, so as to defend Japan’s pride or “saving face” (Ogawa, 2000: 46).  In addition, veterans associations that felt the Japan’s wartime actions were justified, “that Japanese wartime occupation actually freed Asian countries from Western colonial oppression” (Ogawa, 2000: 44).  Moreover, together they felt Japan was a victim of Western power (two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan by the U.S. in World War II), not a victimizer of East Asia.  They do not want “words such as ‘aggression,’ ‘colonization,’ and ‘apology’” (Kishimoto, 2004: 29) in textbooks or letters written to victimized nations.

In the aftermath of several anti-Japanese protests in China in April of 2005, former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, a member of the LDP, offered an apology at the Africa-Asia summit in Jakarta, addressing the actions that were done by Japan during World War II, “Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations;” and also addressing what Japan had done since World War II,

“with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force “ (“Excerpts from Japan PM’s apology,” 2005).  

 

Several apologies were also made by high-ranking Japanese officials regarding the actions taken by Japan in World War II.  However the three events mentioned above were personal apologies by politicians to victimized nations.  In contrast, the Japanese government, over sixty years after the Nanjing Massacre, has not formally recognized the atrocity, nor apologizes, nor paid compensation to the victims.  Many Chinese, Chinese-Americans, and others are demanding that the Japanese government formally recognize the Nanjing Massacre and other atrocities committed by the Japanese military during World War II, and accept responsibility towards the victims.

Chalmers Johnson comments on the Japanese government’s failure to recognize its past atrocities and its failure to take action to uncover the truth in the present,

“Japan has no law covering war crimes, has never brought to justice any Japanese citizen accused of crimes against humanity, is the only advanced democracy whose government censors school history textbooks, and has consistently used its censorship power to suppress information about Japan’s treatment of civilians and prisoners during wartime, including its army’s killing its own citizens in places like Okinawa “ (Johnson, 2000).  

 

    One area that reflects the conflicts of recognizing and denying the atrocities is the issue of history textbooks published in Japan.  These are “‘screened’ (i.e., censored) by the Ministry of Education to ensure that the subject matter is ‘suitable’ to be taught in elementary, junior high, and high schools” (Kishimoto, 2004: 35).  This became a scandal in 1982 when the Chinese government protested after it learned that changes in the history textbooks were made “to deny Japanese responsibility for an aggressive war.”  Examples included changing “invasion” of China to “advance into” China, and “that references to Nanjing Massacre had been deleted” (Buruma, 1995: 126).  

Japanese schoolteachers, students, and other grassroots’ movements (or known as Progressives, considered as left-wing movements by the Japanese government) have continuously challenged the Ministry of Education and the government about the content in the textbooks, demanding the inclusion of wartime atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers during World War II (Buruma, 1995: 192-3).  The great example may be the late Prof. Iegana Saburo (1913 ~ 2002), who sued the Ministry of Education in 1965 for deleting references to the Nanjing Massacre and Unit 731 from his history textbook.  He claimed it was unconstitutional for government to censor textbooks.  Ienaga faced an uphill battle against the government for over thirty years, many times he lost his case, and he was attacked by people from right-wing and subjected to death threats.  In 1997 Ienaga had a small victory; the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that the Ministry of Education acted illegally in removing the contents from his textbook.  However an earlier ruling in 1993 by the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that the government had the right to delete details about the Japanese atrocity in World War II (Lewis, 2002).  

 However, it is important to know there are other textbooks that are used, and the education system in Japan allows the local districts of boards of education to have the power to either adopt the textbooks by the JSHTR or not (Jeans, 2005: 191).  This is shown in the summer of 2001 where 532 out of the 542 school districts in Japan (about 98 percent) choose not to adopt the JSHTR textbook, while only a handful of schools choose to adopt it (Jeans, 2005: 192).  In 2003, there was about 0.13% of junior high schools using the JSHTR textbook “despite aggressive right-wing media campaigns” (Takahashi – 2, 2004).

Another related source of tension between Japan and its neighboring nations is the official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.  This shrine, built during the Meiji Period and originally dedicated to honor those who had died during the Bosin War, was to include those who had died in the later conflicts in which Japan had participated.  Among those enshrined include Koreans and Taiwanese that served in the Japanese Imperial military as colonial subjects “without consultation with family members” (Tanaka, 2004).  The shrine also includes several Class-A war criminals from WWII who were convicted in the Tokyo War Tribunal (Jeans, 2005: 151).

The Class-A war criminals were placed in the shrine during the 1970’s, and the head priests that oversaw the shrine included former members of the Japanese Imperial military.  And the shrine also houses the Yushukan war memorial, which displays military weapons used by the Japanese military during WWII, such as the Mitsubishi Zero fighter (Wakamiya & Watanabe, 2006), and offers a “Japan is innocent” perspective on the causes of WWII.  For example, the reason that Japan entered the war was to free itself along with other Asian nations from Western powers, a belief reflective of the Japanese right-wing (Marquand, 2005).  In the past and present, when high ranking Japanese officials, including Koizumi, visited the Yasukuni Shrine, it usually drew massive protests from Chinese, Koreans, and other citizens in Asian nations (Takahashi – 1, 2004); but the Japanese see it differently.  

The difference is reflected through a survey that was conducted jointly by Asahi Shimbun of Japan, the Dong-A Ilbo of South Korea, and the Chinese Academy of Social Science of China in March of 2005, which found 92 percent in South Korea and 91 percent in China were opposed to Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, whereas in Japan, 28 percent were against the visits, while 54 percent were in favor.  When asked what they say the Yasukuni Shrine represents, 6 out of 10 South Koreans and Chinese saw it as a “symbol of militarism,” where as 7 out of 10 Japanese saw it as a “facility to pay tribute to the war dead” (“Japan disliked by 60% of neighbors,” 2005).  Some questioned if Koizumi was true to his apology in Jakarta, since he had visited the Yasukuni Shrine several times before and after, leaving a bad impression to the Asian nations (Wakamiya, 2005).  And there are growing oppositions to the shrine visits.

In the present there is continued protest from China and [South] Korea over the visits, the revised textbook, as well as territorial disputes (Miyazaki, 2005).   This mistrust between Japan and China had caused friction between the two nations (there is mistrust between Japan and Korea as well).  This became very apparent in the summer of 2004, when China hosted the Asian Cup soccer tournament.  There the Chinese fans harassed the Japanese players and fans, and sat down or booed the Japanese national anthem (the title of the Japanese anthem is “Kimigayo,” meaning “the Emperor’s World”), which drew protest from the Japanese government (Takahashi – 1, 2004).  In a response to Japan's bid to the Security Council in April of 2005, several massive protests erupted in China, where Chinese protesters threw objects at the Japanese embassy, burned Japanese flags, damaged Japanese business and called for boycott of Japanese goods, in which Japan’s Trade Minister Shoichi Nakagawa called China “a scary country” (“Japan: China is ‘scary country,’” 2005).

Some Japanese and others criticize that China uses the Japanese atrocities in World War II to incite nationalism so as to deter its people from other issues, and “intimidate Japan or… to highlight China’s victim’s status” (Morris-Suzuki and Rimmer, 2002: 160).  They also say that China has committed atrocities towards its own people while denying it at the same time, such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre.  Asked by Britain’s Financial Times whether China would close the question of responsibility if Japan met all of Beijing’s demands, Ian Buruma replied, “Probably not… These outbursts of emotional and sometimes violent nationalism in China take place partly because they are the only expression of public protest the government allows” (Halloran, 2005).  But these criticisms do not take the responsibility away from Japan for its actions committed in the past.

Scholars and publics inside and outside of Japan believe the government’s stance on denying any wrong doing in World War II will do more harm to itself.  This was reflected in a survey done in Japan in 1995 by Yomiuri Shimbun, where 70% felt that the Japan’s action in China during World War II poses a threat to the development of more positive relations between China and Japan (JPOLL – 1).  When Asahi Shimbun conducted a survey in Japan in 1997 about the compensation towards China, over half (58%) of those surveyed thought Japan had done “not enough” (JOLL – 2).

But Japan, even in the face of negative repercussion, has consistently refused to make an official apology by the government and allowed right-wing movement to continue to make their stance of “Japan as Innocent,” while politicians and war veterans preserved as powerful voice in Japanese society.

We saw that Germany has taken a more direct approach than Japan in response to the atrocities they committed during World War II.  Germany has admitted the atrocities, taught it in the textbooks, compensated the victims, and built memorials to remind future generations of the past.  Social scientists and historians offer different perspectives on why Germany has been able to progress forward with its past.  

One perspective is the regime changes that Germany experienced after World War II, where the Nazi party was completely removed from the German government.  In contrast in Japan, particularly in the Reverse Course taken by the Allied Forces, many officials and members of the Imperial Government, including Empire Hirohito, were to remain in their position prior to the war and avoiding war criminal trial altogether.  This post-war condition was best described by Robert M. Orr, Jr., “For the U.S. to exonerate Hirohito made it much more difficult for military leaders to conceive of their own guilt.  Since the war was fought in the name of the Emperor, how could soldiers carrying out the will of the Emperor be guilty if the Emperor himself was innocent? (Orr, 1998)”

In his words, Ogawa believed, “acknowledgement of guilt will enable Japan to assure without suspicion the greater role in regional and international arenas that it has sought in recent years” (Ogawa, 2000: 46); this statement could not be truer at a critical time as Japan bids towards a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.  From the Asahi Shimbun poll conducted in April of 2005, 87 percent of South Koreans and 84 percent of Chinese opposed Japan’s bid to the U.N. Security Council (“Japan disliked by 60% of neighbors,” 2005).  

But there are risks in confronting the past.  On the eve of the death of Emperor Hirohito in 1988, the mayor of Nagasaki, Motoshima Hitoshi, commented that the dying emperor had responsibilities for the wartime suffering of the Japanese people.  After Mayor Motoshima made his comment, he was attacked by his own party and the extreme right-wing, and in 1990 the mayor barely survived an assassination attempt by members of the right-wing (Buruma, 1994: 249-50).  When both LDP senior member Koichi Kato and Fuji Xerox chairman Yotaro “Tony” Kobayashi each spoke against Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine separately, members of the right-wing burnt down their houses (Clemons, 2006).

Foreign voices are also threatened by the right-wing; David McNeill, an American, did a radio show in Japan with his wife and they commented on the Nanjing Massacre; after the show was done, members from the right-wing showed up at the radio station and met with the station’s managers.  By pressuring the station’s managers, the right-wing members demanded both McNeill and his wife to apologize for the comment on the Nanjing Massacre and to read an apology statement, which McNeil refused but had to comply: “We decided to read out some of the faxes - only one of which referred specifically to Nanking - and not to read the station’s apology” (McNeill, 2001).

However threats from the right-wing should not discourage people from finding solutions. News reporters inside and outside of Japan have proposed several solutions to improve relations between China and Japan.  One suggestion included conducting an international joint research of the history in the East Asia region (China, Japan, and Korea), promoting information disclosure and conservation of historical materials that were kept away after World War II, and encouraging public discussion on postwar compensation (“AAN Proposals,” 2002).  Others call to reiterate the Murayama statement (Wakamiya, 2005).  And others believed that Emperor Akihito could had delivered the ultimate apology for the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II in the summer of 2005 (Halloran, 2005).  Two editors, Wakamiya Yoshibumi and Watanabe Tsuneo, from competing newspapers in Japan, the Asahi Shimbun, and the Yomiuri Shimbun, called for a construction of a non-secular, national war memorial to replace the Yasukuni Shrine (Wakamiya & Watanabe, 2006).

At the end of this paper, I would like conclude with my personal thoughts.  A true recognition of the wartime events is to take responsibility, not to deny it.  This will be a true show of courage of preserving the truth, instead of following blind patriotism for the individuals involved.  While all the actions above would not guarantee forgiveness from all the victims of the victimized nations, only by admitting to the atrocities committed in the past and paying the reparation to the victims could Japan relieve itself of its heavy burden of guilt, show the courage of confronting the past, gain the trust of East Asian nations, and move forward towards the international stage, just as Germany was able to do.  In doing so, China would no longer attack Japan’s past and use it as a nationalism rally cry; and with the possibility of greater support from forgiving nations, getting a U.N. Security Council seat would not be so unlikely for Japan.

 

1.  Question: “Do you think the Japanese army’s conduct in China and other Asian countries during World War II still poses a threat to the positive development of relations between Japan and China?”

2.  Question: “Do you think Japan has compensated China enough for what it did in the past including World War, or not?”